

CONFIDENTIAL

1963

1081

File No.

1081/63

FO 277/268

N
1292

Name of File—

CAY SAL

(4cc ANSO. 1016/63)

NO MINUTES TO BE WRITTEN HERE

RECORD OF WEEDING		
	INITIALS	DATE
2 YEARS		
5 YEARS (Consular Posts Only)		
10 YEARS		

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UNTIL

2001

LAST Year's File No.

1081/62

NEXT Year's File No.

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

TELEGRAM

(1081)

Cypher ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

Reply received

From:— HAVANA

To:— FOREIGN OFFICE

Despatched

Received

No. 896 of December 31, 1963

Repeated Saving to: Washington (94), Governor of the
Bahamas (43) and CBFCA (3).

My telegram No. 891.

Cay Sal.

In spite of Castro's message reported in my telegram under reference, 11 of the prisoners were released in Havana on December 24 and have been advised by the Cuban authorities to take up employment here. One of them called at H.M. Consulate to ask about proceeding to the Bahamas and was given a noncommittal reply.

2. Yesterday a Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me and said he had been instructed by the Prime Minister to tell me that 11 of these Cuban prisoners had been set free. The dossiers of the remainder were still under active study. He said the Prime Minister had acted in this way in order to improve Anglo Cuban relations and hoped to see me in the new year. I expressed satisfaction *at* the release from gaol of 11 of these men, but I said that HMG's request was that they should all be returned to British territory and that it seemed a pity that this decision had been taken without enabling me to give HMG's reply to what Castro had told me. Deputy Minister said he supposed the question of return to British territory was still open. He expressed appreciation of the measures recently taken by HMG to prevent attacks on Cuba from British territory.

3. If the Cuban government

a) agree to send some or all of these prisoners to Nassau at Cuban expense by DC-3 of Diplomatic charter service;

or b) allow them to leave Cuba by whatever means they can find;

should I make the necessary arrangements?

WATSON

WL46068 Dd.D146 130M (In 3 sorts) 7/61 LP9403

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(1081/63)

TELEGRAM

PRIORITY

Cypher ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

From :— HAVANA

To :— FOREIGN OFFICE

Despatched 1520

Received

No. 891

of

December 23, 1963

Repeated for information to Governor of Bahamas (102) CBFCA (3) and Washington (399).

My telegram No. 873.

Cay Sal.

Castro has sent word to say that he will see me about the prisoners after the anniversary celebrations (on January 2). The official concerned added that the fate of the "three or four" prisoners accused of activities against the Cuban state had not yet been resolved.

2. It now looks as though 15 prisoners will be released some time in January and possibly the other four as well.

3. Castro is clearly still anxious to improve relations with Western countries. For the first time he has sent me and other Western Ambassadors generous Christmas presents of food (mostly imported from Spain). If suitable occasion arises do you wish me to raise any other matter with him?

Governor of Bahamas please pass to CBFCA.

WATSON

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El Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, Sr. Butler, me ha pedido comunique al Primer Ministro, Dr. Castro, que el Gobierno Británico se ha sentido alentado ante las seguridades ofrecidas a mí por el Dr. Castro de que la política del Gobierno de Cuba no era hacer incursiones dentro del territorio Británico en las Islas Bahamas.

El Gobierno Británico se complace en aceptar estas seguridades y, con este motivo, el Gobierno Británico se siente satisfecho al no tener que proseguir con el asunto de una disculpa.

Asimismo, el Gobierno Británico ve con agrado las indicaciones del Dr. Castro al respecto de que confía poner en libertad en breve a los prisioneros con el fin de hacer desaparecer este motivo de fricción que queda entre ambos países, lo cual el Gobierno Británico considera como un gesto propio de un estadista internacional.

El Gobierno Británico desea asegurar al Gobierno de Cuba que no se propone capitalizar políticamente este asunto. Inevitablemente, surgirán indagaciones por parte de la prensa. El Gobierno Británico dará respuesta a las mismas con la simple declaración de que el Gobierno de Cuba ha dado una contestación satisfactoria y que los prisioneros han sido devueltos a la jurisdicción Británica, por cuyo motivo el Gobierno Británico considera el incidente como terminado.

Al mismo tiempo, el Gobierno Británico confía que el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos no irá más allá de una expresión formal de su satisfacción por la liberación de los prisioneros.

El Primer Ministro.../

El Primer Ministro, Dr. Castro, me hizo la sugerencia de que sería juicioso liberar a los prisioneros gradualmente, en vez de todos de una vez. El Gobierno Británico considera que sería de beneficio, tanto al Gobierno de Cuba como al Gobierno Británico, si los prisioneros fuesen puesto en libertad conjuntamente. El libertarlos en distintas etapas mantendría la noticia vigente en los diarios y el interés sobre la misma persistiría hasta que el último de los prisioneros hubiese embarcado. Al Gobierno Británico le luce conveniente, por lo tanto, poner en libertad a los prisioneros conjunta, rápida y calladamente.

El Gobierno Británico desearía conocer la forma en que el Gobierno de Cuba se propone devolver a los prisioneros a la jurisdicción Británica. Si el Gobierno de Cuba está dispuesto a embarcarlos en un buque de la Marina Cubana, llevándolos hasta un punto en alta mar y allí trasladarlos a un buque de la Marina Británica, el Gobierno Británico enviaría una embarcación apropiada al encuentro del navío Cubano en un punto a determinarse entre Cuba y las Islas Bahamas.

Habana, Diciembre 9, 1963.

CONFIDENTIALTELEGRAM

PRIORITY

Cypher ~~XXXXX~~ ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~*From* :— FOREIGN OFFICE*To* :— HAVANA

Despatched

Received

No. 894 of November 26, 1963

Addressed to Havana, telegram No. 894 of November 26, repeated for information to Washington, Governor Bahamas and CBFCA.

Your telegram No. 892 (not to all addressees). (8299 of 19/11).

You spoke well. What CASTRO said was welcome and reassuring. Our aim now must be to get all 19 prisoners released as soon as possible and I should like you to follow up your conversation with him on the following lines. I am happy to accept his assurances to you about Cuban policy in the Bahamas as a reply to our formal protests over ANGUILLA CAY incident and in particular to our request for an apology and for assurances that there will be no future incidents of this kind. On the understanding that Dr. Castro will find it possible to release the prisoners soon as so remove the remaining cause of friction arising out of this incident I shall not now expect any written reply from the Cuban Foreign Minister.

2. In my view however it would be to his and our disadvantage if they were to be released in twos and threes as he suggests. This could only prolong the period during which the story would be newsworthy. The first men to be released would surely give their story to the press and whatever success we may have in persuading British or other newspapers to play down the affair the story would be kept alive until the last prisoners were out of Cuba. It would be over more quickly and perhaps as quietly if they were all sent out together.

3. I very much hope that Castro will accept this argument, but you must judge how far to press him. In the last resort we would naturally settle for release by stages. Either way you will need to discuss the MODALITIES of the return of the prisoners to our jurisdiction. In our notes we asked for them to be

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/returned

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returned to the British authorities in the Bahamas. Subject to the views of the Governor of the Bahamas I would prefer them to be taken back to the vicinity of Anguilla Cay by the Cuban Navy, transferred to one of H.M. ships, taken to Nassau and released there. The Ministry of Defence are seeking CBFCA's views separately on this point.

4. As regards publicity you may assure Dr. Castro that H.M.G. will not wish to make political capital out of the incident. There are bound to be questions from the press and we would propose to answer these by a simple statement to the effect that a satisfactory reply had now been received to our earlier representations, that the prisoners had been returned to our jurisdiction (describing how) and that H.M.G. now considered the matter closed. We are confident that the U.S. Government will not go beyond an expression of pleasure at the release of the prisoners and I doubt whether the press (over whom neither we nor the U.S. Government can hope to have much influence) will be able to make anti-Castro propaganda out of what will be essentially a correct and statesmanlike gesture on Castro's part. Much will depend on the prisoners themselves.

SOSFA

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TELEGRAMCypher ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ROUTINE

From:— FOREIGN OFFICE

To:— HAVANA.

Despatched

Received

No. 884 of November 21, 1963.

Following received from Washington.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram no. 3613 of November 21 repeated for information to Havana and Saving to Governor Bahamas.

Havana telegram no. 829.

I would not repeat not propose to tell the Americans at this stage and increase the risk of a leak. However, if and when there is definite news of the releases, I agree that we should shortly in advance ask American help in playing the matter down, emphasizing the potential damage to the prospects of further releases should there be any public crowing over A Cuban climb down by officials or the press. I should be grateful firmer information about the releases could be telegraphed immediately it becomes available.

Foreign Office pass Havana as my telegram no 211.

SOSFA

(1081/63)

TELEGRAMCypher ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

PRIORITY

From :— HAVANA

To :— FOREIGN OFFICE

Despatched 1900

Received

No. 829 of November 19, 1963.

repeated for information to Washington (376) and
SAVING to Governor Bahamas (32).

My immediately preceding telegram.

Anguilla Cay.

Castro took me well away from his guards etc., and then began by saying that the Cuban raid of Anguilla Cay had been carried out in the heat of the moment when Cuba was under great provocation from the United States. He would like Her Majesty's Government to understand that it was no part of Cuban policy to violate British sovereignty or to carry out unlawful acts in the Bahamas. He did not think such incidents would happen again. He was glad we had increased our patrols of the remoter islands.

2. When I got the chance, after assuring Castro that I knew Her Majesty's Government would welcome this statement, I said that he must have seen from the mild tone of our reply that we did not want to pick a quarrel, but wanted to live at peace with our neighbour. The Cuban Government had asked us to make our authority over the remoter islands more effective; and this we had done. For our part we expected the Cuban Government to make no further raids and to return the 19 prisoners. This last issue still weighed heavily on our relations with Cuba.

3. Castro then spoke at some length about his desire for good relations with us. Cuba got on quite well with Britain really and also with Canada. It was nonsense to say he could not work with Anglo-Saxons. He then repeated the charges against four of the 19 prisoners. Finally he said that he thought it would be possible to release them all "perhaps gradually and discreetly", But it was important to him that their

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release should not be used for a propaganda exercise against Cuba. Would I please inform you privately what he had said.

4. I take this to mean that Castro recognizes that the raid on Anguilla Cay was unwise; that we have tightened up security measures, which was his basic request; and that for the sake of improving relations with us and especially expanding trade, he had better hand back the prisoners. What he means by a propaganda exercise is presumably that the release of these prisoners should not be portrayed as a defeat for him and that he should not lose face by it.

5. I have assumed that our object is to get the 19 men released; and that we ourselves are prepared not to make capital out of their return, and perhaps give such guidance as may seem possible to the press in the United Kingdom. If I can speak on these lines to Castro on your behalf, I think we might get the prisoners out perhaps in dribblets. But it seems to me that what Castro really wants is for us to ask the United States Administration not to make capital out of the release of the men either.

WATSON

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10-1/73

No. 2-6

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy present their compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba, on instructions from Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, have the honour to reply to the Ministry's No. 1-55 of the 10th of September in the following terms.

It is to be seen from the Ministry's note of the 10th of September that the Cuban Government admit that some of their armed forces violated British territory. In the absence, however, of any explicit denial on the Cuban Government's part, Her Majesty's Government need only point out that it is considered that the evidence is in fact contradictory.

In so far as the Ministry's note of the 10th of September seems to show that the Cuban Government allow no justification for the incursions into British territory of armed forces, Her Majesty's Government need only state that they regard such an allegation as wholly untenable. Her Majesty's Government have not taken any steps to put a stop to any activities occurring on British territory which might be considered as such, and will continue to do so. On receipt of any reliable information that British territory has been used for such activities, British authorities have always taken prompt steps to put an end to them. They will continue to act in this way. Her Majesty's Government decisively reject allegations in the Ministry's note that the British authorities have shown tolerance and even complicity in their attitude to such activities. Furthermore, Her Majesty's Government have seen no evidence that any improper activities directed against Cuba have been organised or sponsored in the Americas by the United States Government.

Her Majesty's Government feel constrained to

/observe

TRADUCCION NO-OFICIAL

La Embajada de Su Majestad Británica saluda muy atentamente al Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de la República de Cuba y actuando bajo las instrucciones del Secretario Principal de Estado para Relaciones Exteriores, tiene el honor de dar respuesta a la Nota del Ministerio No. 1095, del 10 de Septiembre, en la forma siguiente:

De la citada Nota del Ministerio del 10 de Septiembre no se desprende con claridad si el Gobierno de Cuba admite o no que miembros de sus fuerzas armadas violaron territorio británico. Sin embargo, en ausencia de una negativa explícita del Gobierno de Cuba, el Gobierno de Su Majestad solo puede reiterar su punto de vista al efecto de que las pruebas en su poder son incontrovertibles.

Algunos pasajes de la Nota del 10 de Septiembre parecen indicar que el Gobierno de Cuba está alegando justificación por la incursión a territorio británico por miembros de las fuerzas armadas de Cuba. El Gobierno de Su Majestad se siente obligado a manifestar que considera este alegato completamente inadmisiblemente. El Gobierno de Su Majestad ha hecho, y continuará haciendo, esfuerzos máximos para poner término a la perpetración de actos dentro de territorio británico, que puedan estar dirigidos contra Cuba. Cada vez que se ha recibido una información fidedigna de que se estaba utilizando territorio británico para tales fines, las autoridades británicas han adoptado medidas inmediatas para poner fin a los mismos, y así continuará haciéndolo en el futuro. El Gobierno de Su Majestad Británica rechaza enérgicamente las imputaciones contenidas en la Nota del Ministerio al efecto de que las autoridades británicas han rostrado tolerancia, y aún complicidad, en su actitud hacia estos actos. Además, el Gobierno de Su Majestad Británica no tiene indicio alguno de que se hayan organizado o fomentado actos contra Cuba desde las Bahamas por el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos.

El Gobierno de Su Majestad Británica se siente constreñido al observar que si el Gobierno de Cuba tenía motivos para creer que se estaban llevando a cabo actos contra Cuba desde Cayo Anguila.../

Anguila debía, si deseaba que se les pusiera fin a los mismos, haber informado, de acuerdo con las leyes internacionales, a las autoridades británicas, quienes hubiesen adoptado las medidas necesarias. El Gobierno de Su Majestad no encuentra dato alguno en la Nota del 10 de Septiembre que le haga cambiar su conclusión de que la incursión por miembros de las fuerzas armadas de Cuba a territorio y aguas jurisdiccionales británicas constituyó una violación flagrante de las leyes internacionales.

El Gobierno de Su Majestad Británica ha tomado debida nota de las seguridades ofrecidas en la Nota del Ministerio de que es política del Gobierno de Cuba el facilitar la salida del país de cualquier ciudadano que así lo solicitare. De acuerdo con estas seguridades y en vista de que ninguna de las personas capturadas en Cayo Anguila parecen haber cometido delito alguno directamente relacionado con su salida de Cuba, el Gobierno de Su Majestad vería con gusto que se le informase cuando el Gobierno de Cuba se propone devolver los prisioneros en cuestión, según con la solicitud anteriormente formulada.

Asimismo, el Gobierno de Su Majestad ha tomado nota de que el Gobierno de Cuba no le ha ofrecido las disculpas y seguridades solicitadas por el Gobierno de Su Majestad y a los que tiene derecho. El Gobierno de Su Majestad deplora esta omisión que no puede conducir al mejoramiento de las relaciones, cuyo deseo el Gobierno de Cuba ha expresado en repetidas ocasiones. El Gobierno de Su Majestad se siente obligado a advertir de manera solemne y formal al Gobierno de Cuba que cualquier otra incursión a territorio británico podría tener las más graves consecuencias.

Al repetir su solicitud de que se le ofrezcan disculpas y seguridades de que se impartirán las instrucciones necesarias a las fuerzas armadas de Cuba para evitar que vuelva a producirse otra violación de territorio británico, la Embajada de Su Majestad aprovecha la oportunidad para reiterar al Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores el testimonio de su más alta y distinguida consideración.

EL GOBIERNO BRITANICO
LONDRES.

Registry
No.

* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should
reach addressee(s)

Top Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Open

EMERGENCY
IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE
with
— priority
without
DEFERRED

(Date).....

Despatched...

Draft.

Telegram to:—

[Security classification] CONFIDENTIAL
—if any

No.

[Codeword]—if any.

(Date)

Address to..... FOREIGN OFFICE

And to:—

telegram No

691

(date)

4/10

repeated for information to WASHINGTON AND GOVERNOR
BAHAMAS

Repeat to:—

Anguilla, Cay.

M.I.P.T.

En Clair
Code
Cypher

Distribution

Copies to:—

Roa/was in/a/relaxed mood/. He/ took well
my statement that, as our Note made plain, IMG,
were not/prepared, to, allow, anybody to, carry/out
acts in 'the Bahamas contrary to International Law,
and 'he welcomed my statement that we were further
strengthening our forces there. When he
mentioned the 'U.S. Government I said 'we were
satisfied they did not encourage use of the
Bahamas. I 'quoted press release' of August 20 /
which was 'apparently news to Roa.

2. I repeated 'that if the Cuban Government had
any 'reliable information 'about 'illegal activity
being planned against Cuba from British territory,
the 'right course 'was to 'inform me 'at any hour,
Roa said the Cuban Government 'would carefully '
examine 'this possibility. He also confirmed 'that
they 'would examine the possibility 'of letting the
19 prisoners return to the Bahamas. I 'confirmed
that the Governor would admit them.

3. Roa said 'it was important to 'exchange views

/frankly

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

frankly and in confidence on these matters.

The Cubans did not want to disclose these
correspondence.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

4. 'Roa' must of course consult his master. But I had the impression that Cubans may believe that we intend to prevent the use of the Bahamas for illegal acts by either side, and are putting ourselves in a position to do so. / In order not to forfeit our willingness to do this, they may perhaps return some or all of the prisoners.

I believe ^{that to maintain this} we must keep these exchanges secret.

I would prefer to say nothing to the press about the contents of the note. / ~~essentially~~ References to renewing our demand for satisfaction (your tel no. 701) or to return of Cuban prisoners (Washington tel no. 3063 to you) seem likely to jeopardize our getting the prisoners back.

5. In answer to news questions about prisoners could we not simply point to Castro's repeated public assurances recently that anyone can leave Cuba?

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

4/1

TELEGRAMCypher ~~Code~~ ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

ROUTINE

From :— HAVANA

To :— FOREIGN OFFICE

Despatched 1115

Received

No. 659 of September 19, 1963.

repeated for information to Washington (328) and
Governor Bahamas (61).

My immediately preceding telegram.

Cay Sal.

Our reply to the Cuban Note of September 10
might also include following points.

- (a) We reject Cuban assumption that local British authorities have shown "tolerance and even complicity" towards "aggression against Cuba" from their territories.
- (b) Her Majesty's Government have seen no evidence at all that attacks against Cuba carried out from the Bahamas have been organized or sponsored by United States Government. That Government has, in fact given us valuable assistance in measures against illegal attempts. (If United States Government decide to take action referred to in last paragraph of Washington tel no. 2890 to you, we could cite this).
- (c) The Cubans do not deny that their armed forces violated British territory but offer no apologies or assurances against a repetition. The last paragraph of their Note seems to imply on the contrary that in certain circumstances they will be ready to repeat the violation. We deplore this attitude which is bound to be an impediment to the better relations which the Cuban Government have repeatedly said that they desire. Further incursions of this kind may have serious consequences.

/ (d) Her

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- (d) Her Majesty's Government welcome the assurances in the Cuban Note that it is the Cuban Government's policy to "give facilities to leave the country to any citizens requesting them".
- (e) The Cuban Note confirms that the 19 persons arrested were not engaged in action against Cuba but were seeking to leave the country. We assume that the Cuban Government will now make arrangements for these 19 people to leave Cuba in accordance with their wish. (According to rumour here, four have already been shot; but I see no reason to give up at this stage our demand that all should be released).

WATSON

CONFIDENTIAL

TELEGRAMCypher ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ROUTINE

From :— HAVANA

To :— FOREIGN OFFICE

Despatched

Received

No. 658 of September 19, 1963.

repeated for information to Washington (327), and Governor Bahamas (60).

Your tel no. 642.

Reply to Cuban Note.

Main Cuban contention is that "Aggression against Cuba" has repeatedly taken place from the Bahamas. (This we can no longer deny). They argue that these attacks occur either because Her Majesty's Government cannot exercise adequate control over the Bahamas or because of the "Tolerance and even complicity" of the local British authorities. Our main complaint is that the Cubans have violated British territory, and threaten to do it again.

2. Our reply must deal with both these points; especially as exchange of notes may be made public at any time. How we cover these two major issues and other outstanding points in our reply, will depend on

- (a) whether you decide to act in the sense of my tel 655;
- (b) how far we feel able (perhaps with increased United States help?) to prevent violation of Bahamas by both Cuban exiles and Cuban Government forces.

3. If we feel on firm enough ground, the most effective reply to the Cuban Government would be to recognize that both certain groups of Cuban exiles and the Cuban Government have violated the sovereignty of the Bahamas in the past and to make it plain that Her Majesty's Government will take effective steps

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to prevent such violations in the future. I hope that language can be found which will cover both invasion by Castro forces and misuse of islands by anti-Castro ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ elements, but which does not commit us to do more than we can in practice manage.

4. The Cuban Government would, of course, be delighted if we offered to co-operate with them in policing the islands. While this is unacceptable, you may think we could go so far as to say that if the Cuban Government at any time have reason to believe that an attack against Cuba is being mounted from British territory, Her Majesty's Government would be prepared to investigate it promptly and take immediate measures against it.

5. Suggestions on less important points are in my immediately following telegram.

WATSON

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CONFIDENTIAL

~~(1016/63)~~

TELEGRAM

Cypher ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

IMMEDIATE

From :— HAVANA

To :— FOREIGN OFFICE

Despatched

Received

No. 655 of September 18, 1963.

repeated for information immediate to Washington (325) and Governor Bahamas (personal) 5.

Washington tel no. 2890 to you.

Air Attacks on Cuba.

Castro has known or assumed for some time that recent air attacks on Cuba were using Bahamas as a base. His Note of September 10 specifically states that "numerous pirate attacks by air" have been made from British territories; and refers to the "tolerance and even complicity" of the local British authorities. Apart from direct tracking of aircraft etc., the Cuban Government apparently have effective intelligence sources in Cuban counter-revolutionary organizations who know about these operations. Moreover much of the information given to us by the State Department will presumably become public eventually as a result either of legal action now contemplated by United States Government, leaks to the press, or in some other way. In any case, Cuban Government may at any time obtain complete confirmation if they force down a raiding aircraft.

2. You may therefore think that there is much to be said for making a virtue of necessity, by volunteering to the Cubans the substance of the information now given to us by the State Department before the news breaks. If so, I hope that the United States Government would agree to our giving them the credit for informing us and would allow us to repeat that United States Government deplore this misuse of British territory. Any such communication should, of course stress that these activities were carried on without the knowledge or approval of either the Americans or ourselves and that we propose to continue to take measures to prevent

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illegal intrusion of all kinds into the Bahamas. We could put sufficient stress on the last point to make it clear that it applied also to any further intrusion by Cuban armed forces.

3. It seems to me that this course would help to keep down Castro's temperature over these incidents, preserve our reputation for straight dealing and make our reply to the Cuban Note more convincing and effective. I believe this reply should be subsequent and separate.

4. I presume that in speaking to the Cubans I should not now either flatly reject the allegations in their Note or make the point in the last sentence of paragraph 2 of your tel no. 644.

5. I am likely to present credentials either on September 20 or 23. My first business meeting, at which Bahamas question must come up, is likely to follow shortly. I should therefore be grateful for early instructions.

WATSON

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

~~(1081/63)~~

IMMEDIATE

TELEGRAM

1081

Cypher ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

From :— FOREIGN OFFICE To :— HAVANA.

Despatched

Received

No. 649 of September 17, 1963.

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Following received from Washington.

Addressed to the Foreign Office tel no. 2890 of September 17 repeated for information to Governor Bahamas (personal), Havana, CBFCA.

Aerial Attacks on Cuba.

CRIMMINS, the State Department co-ordinator for Cuban affairs has informed us that recent air raids on Cuba may have been carried out from British territories. The following account of raids has been given to the United States Authorities by William J. JOHNSON, United States citizen associated with M.I.R.R., the militant Cuban exile organisation led by Orlando BOSCH.

2. According to Johnson, MIRR have on several occasions flown small aircraft to BIMINI in the Bahamas where under cover of darkness and when the airport has been officially closed they have loaded up with explosives brought in from Florida by launch. Aircraft involved have included a CESSNA with United States registration, MONYEGG 822B and a Cessna 175 number N.7272 M. On raids aircraft have been piloted by another United States citizen Jack Benson GRIFFIN accompanied by trained Cubans. In this manner raids were carried out at night on the following dates:

- (a) August 14 on the Bolivia Sugar Mill near Moron.
- (b) On September 5. Failing to locate sugar mills as lights had been extinguished bombs were jetisonned over city of Santa Clara. According to a Cuban Armed Forces communiqué of September 6

S E C R E T

one woman may have been killed and three children injured on this raid.

- (c) On September 7 a (two groups undec) operation when aircraft was forced to turn back.
- (d) On September 8 (cf Havana tel 637) on sugar mill Jaronu in Camaguey province..

According to another source raid~~e~~ at (a) or another on the same date was staged through Andros Island and not Bimini.

3. Crimmins said that Americans accept Johnson's story although he has been evasive and it is not excluded that parts may have been fabricated. Americans have no evidence of any air raids being carried out during this period from United States territory or from Central America. Crimmins was emphatic in stating that the United States Government deplore these attacks. They would be grateful for any information ourselves, Bahamian authorities can provide. The Americans are, however, anxious that investigations be carried out discreetly as they ~~were~~ engaged on operations to discover others who may be involved. Johnson and Griffiths are under close surveillance in Miami as is Bosch, who is now in Chicago and is reported to be trying to recruit additional pilots and purchase longer-range aircraft. It has not been decided what action will be taken against Cubans but legal action is contemplated against American citizens who are implicated.

Foreign Office pass Havana as mytel 171.

SOSFA

S E C R E T

TELEGRAMCypher ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~IMMEDIATE

From :— HAVANE

To :— FOREIGN OFFICE

Despatched 1330

Received

No. 647 of September 13, 1963.

repeated for information to Bahamas (58) and Washington 321.

My tel no. 643.

As you have seen, the Cuban Note not only rejects our requests for an apology, assurances against a repetition of the incident and the return of the prisoners, but in effect says that unless we take effective measures to deny the use of the islands to counter-revolutionaries they will do so themselves.

2. The Cubans have not yet published their note and may not do so. This may give us a little breathing space because we shall clearly get nowhere with Castro in his present state of mind. Even so, I do not think that we can pass over in silence the implied threat against British territory at the first meetings between Her Majesty's Ambassador and the Foreign Minister and President.

3. The Ambassador is due to arrive today and would normally be received by the Foreign Minister early next week. You may, therefore, care to give urgent consideration to what he might say. My impression is that the Cubans will wish to be more reasonable when Castro has had time to cool down. It might therefore be better to make a firm reservation of our rights but not to press the Cubans too far for the time being.

Foreign Office please pass.

SCOTT

MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

No.1095

Translation sent to bag
to address of, and under
ref of Tel. — of Sept. 11
L. H. M. x 842

EL MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES saluda muy atentamente

a la Embajada de Su Majestad Británica y responde a su Nota de 21 de agosto en los siguientes términos:

El día 14 de agosto el Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias informó textualmente: "Unidades de la Marina de Guerra Revolucionaria dieron alcance y recuperaron, en las proximidades de Cayo Anguila, dos barcos pesqueros cubanos, que habían sido sustraídos por elementos contrarrevolucionarios.

"Los asaltantes de las embarcaciones fueron capturados, figurando entre ellos cuatro miembros de organizaciones contrarrevolucionarias radicados en Miami, los cuales habían sido introducidos clandestinamente en Cuba por la Agencia Central de Inteligencia para llevar a cabo actividades de carácter subversivo contra nuestra Patria."

Evidencia la falsedad de las informaciones que el Gobierno de Estados Unidos brinda al Gobierno británico acerca de la identidad de los autores de la fechoría, a quienes presenta como refugiados perseguidos — por el Gobierno cubano, el hecho de que los que organizaron y llevaron a

/cabe

A la Embajada de Su Majestad Británica,
La Habana.

MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

- 2 -

cabe el robo de dichos barcos son:

ISMAEL ROJAS DELGADO, residente en West Flager No. 532, apartamento 2, Miami. Salió clandestinamente de Cuba el 19 de agosto de 1962 - por Playa Caye, Yaguajay, Las Villas, en una lancha robada, nombrada "Sonia Ester". Entrenado durante dos meses por la Agencia Central de Inteligencia del Gobierno de Estados Unidos para actividades de infiltración, sa botaje, secuestro de embarcaciones y traslado de contrarrevolucionarios de nuestro país, utilizando para ello las posesiones británicas inmediatas a Cuba, donde eran avituallados por un avión anfibio de la Marina de Guerra norteamericana.

FRANCISCO BREIJO MONZON, residente en 29 NE, Segunda Avenida, apartamento 40, Miami. Salió clandestinamente de Cuba el 16 de julio de 1961 por la Bahía de Matanzas, en una lancha robada.

OSMANI NODARSE GONZALEZ, residente en 129 SW, Cuarta Avenida, apartamento 40, Miami. Salió clandestinamente de Cuba el 2 de noviembre de 1962 en una embarcación robada, nombrada "Cuatro Hermanos".

GREGORIO FERNANDEZ FERNANDEZ, residente en 669, NW, calle 26, Miami. Salió clandestinamente de Cuba por Santa Cruz del Norte, provincia de La Habana, el 13 de junio de 1961, en otra embarcación igualmente robada "La Taitiana".

Estos cuatro sujetos fueron introducidos de nuevo clandestinamente en Cuba con fines subversivos y de nuevo llevaban dos embarcaciones robadas, en las cuales, por dinero, transportaban hacia Estados Unidos las restantes personas con ellos capturadas.

Sen, pues, elementos delincuentes reincidentes, dedicados a la piratería al amparo del Gobierno de Estados Unidos, país donde residían. - Los datos acerca de la identidad del lugar donde residían estos sujetos antes referidos, puede comprobarlos el Gobierno Británico fácilmente por sus propios medios.

Durante más de tres años la Agencia Central de Inteligencia ha estado utilizando Caye Elbow, Caye Dos Recas, Caye Anguila y otras islas - del Banco de Caye Sal y de las Bahamas para introducir armas, explosivos, - agentes subversivos, espías y saboteadores en nuestro país, para perpetrar hechos delictivos contra el pueblo de Cuba. Desde estos mismos puntos y - otras posesiones británicas situadas en la zona, han preparado numerosos - ataques piratas por aire y por mar contra el territorio de Cuba y contra - embarcaciones que se dirigían o provenían de nuestro país; incluso embarcaciones comerciales británicas han sido tacadas por elementos piratas que - operaban desde las propias posesiones británicas.

/Estados

Estados Unidos no sólo insiste en esa política que entraña la violación sistemática y el uso constante del territorio británico para agredir a Cuba, sino que ahora trata de arrastrar al Gobierno de Su Majestad a su estúpida y criminal política de intrigas, calumnias, hostilidades y agresiones contra nuestro país.

No es el Gobierno de Cuba, sino el Gobierno de Estados Unidos -- quien ha estado violando reiterada y sistemáticamente la integridad de esos territorios para perpetrar fechorías de carácter internacional contra la República de Cuba.

El Gobierno británico no puede actuar ni proceder como si ignorara esos hechos.

Asevera la atención que el Gobierno de Su Majestad Británica -- presta a las informaciones del Gobierno de Estados Unidos sobre incidentes surgidos con motivo de los actos de piratería que se perpetran contra Cuba, cual si dichas informaciones fuesen dignas del más mínimo respeto, cual si el Gobierno informante no hubiese actuado como un vulgar delincuente internacional con respecto a Cuba, cual si ese Gobierno no fuese responsable de la política criminal de agresiones contra nuestro país utilizando no sólo su propio territorio, sino el territorio de numerosos países centroamericana-

/nos,

MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

- 5 -

nos, y muy repetidas veces los territorios que están bajo la jurisdicción - del Gobierno de Su Majestad Británica, con presumible tolerancia y aún complicidad de las autoridades que rigen dichos territorios.

Aún cuando el pasado mes de abril, como se expresa en la Nota - de la Embajada de Gran Bretaña, la misma dió amplias seguridades de que su Gobierno se opondría terminantemente al uso de sus territorios en el Caribe con fines ilegales contra Cuba, el Gobierno cubano posee pruebas de que después de esas seguridades dichos territorios han sido utilizados reiteradas veces para perpetrar ataques piratas e introducir armas, explosivos, saboteadores y espías en nuestro país.

Por estos hechos ni por ninguna de las fechorías cometidas contra Cuba desde territorio británico, el Gobierno de Su Majestad dió a Cuba-ninguna explicación satisfactoria.

Los delincuentes sorprendidos in fraganti en la perpetración de esos actos desde territorio de posesiones británicas, han sido tratados con una tolerancia y benignidad tales por las autoridades de dichas posesiones-que no refleja ninguna seriedad en el propósito de reprimir estos actos de bandolerismo.

El Gobierno de Su Majestad Británica no ha demandado ninguna satisfacción del Gobierno de Estados Unidos por las innumerables ocasiones en-

/que

MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

- 6 -

que su Agencia Central de Inteligencia ha violado dichos territorios en actos directamente dirigidos contra la soberanía y la integridad del territorio cubano.

Extraña concepción de la soberanía es la que invoca el Gobierno de Su Majestad Británica sobre unos islotes situados a miles de millas de distancia de la Gran Bretaña, con relación a los cuales ha sido incapaz de impedir que se conviertan en guarida de piratas y delincuentes y en base de agresiones contra un país soberano que resiste con dignidad y firmeza las agresiones de un Gobierno poderoso y con inentabables recursos como es el de Estados Unidos.

El concepto de soberanía sobre esos territorios implica el deber elemental de impedir que los mismos se conviertan en trampolín de agresiones contra otro país.

Es absurda la acusación de que intentamos perseguir a los refugiados, cuando nuestra política, sobradamente conocida, ha sido y es la de dar facilidades para que salga del país todo ciudadano que lo solicite y es el Gobierno de Estados Unidos quien realiza todos los esfuerzos imaginables por impedir que los cubanos que deseaban viajar a Estados Unidos y a los cuales concedió visa, salgan hacia ese país.

/El

MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

- 7 -

El Gobierno de Estados Unidos suspendió los vuelos regulares entre La Habana y Miami, en los que dichas personas podían viajar cómodamente y sin riesgo alguno. El Gobierno de Estados Unidos propicia en cambio el uso de embarcaciones y otros medios irregulares para su propaganda contra Cuba, aunque ello entraña riesgos de accidentes y pérdidas de vidas.

El Gobierno de Cuba rechaza, por tanto, terminantemente las imputaciones contenidas en la Nota de la Embajada de Su Majestad Británica y demanda que las posesiones inglesas situadas alrededor de Cuba dejen de ser guarida de piratas y trampolines de agresión contra nuestro país, o de lo contrario, caerá sobre él la responsabilidad de las medidas que el Gobierno de Cuba, en uso de su legítimo derecho de defensa, se vea en la necesidad de tomar.

EL MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES aprovecha la ocasión para reiterar a la Embajada de Su Majestad Británica el testimonio de su más alta y distinguida consideración.

La Habana, 10 de septiembre de 1963

(1081/63)

CONFIDENTIAL



American Department
Foreign Office.

With the compliments of

THE CHANCERY

Reference Telegram No. 642 of Sep-
tember 11, 1963.

BRITISH EMBASSY

HAVANA

September 12, 1963.

CONFIDENTIAL

(1081/63)



Chancery,
Washington.

With the compliments of

THE CHANCERY

Reference telegram No. 642 of
September 11, 1963.

BRITISH EMBASSY

HAVANA

September 12, 1963.

CONFIDENTIAL

(1081/63)



Governor,
Bahamas.

With the compliments of

THE CHANCERY

Reference telegram No. 642 of
September 11, 1963.

BRITISH EMBASSY

HAVANA

September 12, 1963.

Article

Republic of Cuba

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

No. 1145

On the basis of the information received from the Cuban Government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba has the honor to inform you that the Cuban Government has decided to grant political asylum to the following persons:

1. Mr. [Name], born [Date], of [Nationality], formerly [Position], who has been active in the Cuban Revolution, and who has been persecuted by the Cuban Government.

2. Mr. [Name], born [Date], of [Nationality], formerly [Position], who has been active in the Cuban Revolution, and who has been persecuted by the Cuban Government.

3. Mr. [Name], born [Date], of [Nationality], formerly [Position], who has been active in the Cuban Revolution, and who has been persecuted by the Cuban Government.

4. Mr. [Name], born [Date], of [Nationality], formerly [Position], who has been active in the Cuban Revolution, and who has been persecuted by the Cuban Government.

For the purpose of the above, the Cuban Government has decided to grant political asylum to the following persons:

5. Mr. [Name], born [Date], of [Nationality], formerly [Position], who has been active in the Cuban Revolution, and who has been persecuted by the Cuban Government.

6. Mr. [Name], born [Date], of [Nationality], formerly [Position], who has been active in the Cuban Revolution, and who has been persecuted by the Cuban Government.

These four/

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TELEGRAMCypher ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~PRIORITY

From :— HAVANA

To :— FOREIGN OFFICE

Despatched 0930

Received

No. 643 of September 12, 1963.

repeated for information to Washington (318) and Governor Bahamas (56).

M.I.P.T.

This Note is very much what one would expect from Castro in his present mood (my tel no. 637) and bears many signs that he has been personally involved in drafting. It uses many of his favourite phrases, is repetitive and varies between the first and the third person. There is an important obscurity which may not be deliberate in the final paragraph where 'it' grammatically refers to the Cuban Government but may be intended to refer either to Her Majesty's Government or to the American Government. The violent and aggressive tone of the Note is in marked contrast with the attitude of Roa and Rodriguez and officials of the Ministry who seemed anxious to play down the episode. All these indications support a rumour, which is now current in Havana, that the draft prepared by the Ministry was rejected by Castro as too feeble and accommodating.

2. The Cubans have not yet said whether they intend to publish their Note. If they do, we shall no doubt be obliged to return soon to the issue of the violation of British territory but I think that it would be better to wait if we can for Castro's fury over the recent raids to cool before we return to the charge.

Foreign Office pass Bahamas (56)

SCOTT

TELEGRAMCypher ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~IMMEDIATE

From:— HAVANA

To:— FOREIGN OFFICE

Despatched 1835

Received

No. 642 of September 11, 1963.

repeated for information to Washington (319) and Governor Bahamas (57).

My tel no. 640.

Cay Sal.

The Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs today delivered a reply dated September 10 to my Note of August 21. Full translation follows by bag due to leave here on September 13. Following is a brief summary,

2. The Note repeats the allegation (my tel no. 589) that among those captured were four counter-revolutionaries introduced by C.I.A. It gives their names and addresses in Miami.

3. For more than three years CIA has been using British territories for aggressive acts against Cuba presumably with the tolerance or even the complicity of the authorities. It is not Cuba but the United States which has repeatedly violated the integrity of the territories. The British Government cannot act as though it were ignorant of these facts.

4. Despite the guarantees given last April, the use of these territories for illegal acts has continued without the British Government offering any satisfactory explanation. Criminals caught in the act in British territories have been treated with a tolerance and leniency which does not suggest that there is any serious intention to prevent these activities. Sovereignty over these territories involves the elementary duty to prevent their conversion into a springboard of aggression against another country.

/5. The

CONFIDENTIAL

5. The Note ends: "The Government of Cuba therefore decisively rejects the imputations contained in the Note of Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy and demands that the English possessions situated around Cuba should cease to be a refuge of pirates and springboards of aggression against our country or otherwise the responsibility will fall on it (sic) for the measures which the Cuban Government in exercise of its legitimate right of defence finds it necessary to take."

Foreign Office please pass Bahamas.

SCOTT

TELEGRAMCypher ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~IMMEDIATE

From :— HAVANA

To :— FOREIGN OFFICE

Despatched 1245

Received

No. 640 of September 11, 1963.

repeated for information to Washington (317) and Governor Bahamas (55).

My tel no. 637. Paragraph 3.

I now learn that at the same reception Castro referred to our protest on the Anguilla Cay incident. He said that he could not understand the attitude of the British who allowed infiltrators and saboteurs to use the Bahamas and then protested when Cuba tried to defend itself against this.

2. Cuban press reports of these attacks invariably say that the aircraft approached from and returned to the North. Most of the attacks have been in Eastern Cuba directly south of the Bahamas.

3. With Castro in his present mood, it is probable that the reply to our protest (my tel no. 628) will include a strong counter attack alleging that the Bahamas are being used as a base by the raiders. It would, therefore, be very useful if I could be armed in advance with material for a reply on this point. Do you have any definite information about the origin of the raiders and the bases used by them?

4. I hope that we can offer proof that territory in the Bahamas is not involved and repeat our assurances that we shall do all we can to prevent this. The raids serve no conceivable purpose and tend to consolidate the régime which has made full emotional use of the propaganda opportunities offered by the killing and wounding of innocent people.

Foreign Office please pass

SCOTT

CONFIDENTIAL

**SECRET
MESSAGE**

IN

1081/63

211340Z August

From: C P F C A

Date: 21.8.63

Recd: 1016Z

To: CAPRICE
LONDONLERRY
IRSA
PARTAR

Info: Foreign Office
C.O.D.
Admiralty
C.B.N.S. Washington
H.M.A.'s Washington and Havana
United States Coastguard Seventh District
COMNAVSTFOR
J.S. Nassau
Port of Palmas
Police Commissioner Nassau

WARNING

NO UNCLASSIFIED REPLY OR REFERENCE

Operations 1 in Bahamas.

Amend. Number 1 to Operation Order 2/63 (W105/1 of 17 Aug.)
Delete existing sub. paragraph 3 (B) (Legal Position) and substitute
the following:

Ocean Warnings

If Ocean Warships are encountered inside British Territorial Waters without previous notification of proposed passage, they are to be informed (unless the Commanding Officer of the Patrolling Ship is satisfied that their passage is innocent), that their unauthorised presence in British Waters is unacceptable and required to proceed outside the 3 mile limit.

Insert new Sub paragraph 3 (H) as follows:

Legal Position. Commanding Officers are to be guided by the contents of Annex A.

Amend preamble of paragraph c Annex A (Legal Position of Foreign Warships in British Territorial Waters) to read as follows:

The procedure to be followed when any armed vessel or aircraft of any Government is encountered in British Territorial Waters/Air Space should be as follows (innocent passage excepted).

211340Z

VK/19

SECRET

Handwritten:
9/9
M. J. G. 19
10/10
10/10

TELEGRAM

Cypher code en clair

From :— HAVANA

To :— FO

Despatched

Received

No. 602 of 21/8

R.F.I. Immediate to Washington (291), Governor Bahamas (52).

MIPT. Cay Sal.

When he had read the Note Rodriguez remarked that much of our information came from American sources. He appreciated our difficulties in controlling a large number of widely scattered islands but he thought that it was unfortunate that we had to rely on American help. Their hostile acts against Cuba were at the root of the trouble. I said that in carrying out our policy of denying the use of the islands for illegal purposes, we had welcomed the co-operation of the American Coast Guards and that this had in fact been most useful.

2. I then made the points in paragraph 2 of your tel no. 594. Rodriguez made no attempt to deny either the facts in the note nor that the Cubans concerned were refugees.

3. Rodriguez said that he would pass our Note to the Foreign Minister at once and let us have a considered reply as soon as possible. When I told him that it was our intention to publish the Note he asked whether we proposed to wait for the Cuban reply before doing so but did not demur when I told him that it was our intention to publish at once.

4. Rodriguez said that he regretted the incident because the Cuban Government desired the friendliest possible relations with Britain. I said that I too regretted the episode which was bound to complicate our relations.

5. The photographs had not reached me before this interview but are due to arrive by bag later to-day.

SCOTT

(1081/63)

TELEGRAM

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~
~~Cypher code~~

en clair

From :— HAVANA

To :— ~~RE~~ FOREIGN OFFICE

Despatched

Received

No. 601 of August 21, 1963.

repeated for information to Washington (290) immediate,
and Governor Bahamas (51).

Your tel no. 594.

I delivered the amended Note to Vice
Minister Rodriguez at noon local time today with
following additional minor amendments.

2. Paragraph 2 for frigate read destroyer.
Paragraph 3 after Cuban Ambassador insert
London.

2. See my immediately following telegram.

SCOTT

173

1. The first step is to identify the problem or question that needs to be answered. This involves understanding the context and the specific requirements of the task.

2. Next, it is important to gather relevant information and data. This can be done through research, consultation with experts, or by analyzing existing data sets.

3. Once the information is gathered, the next step is to analyze it. This involves identifying patterns, trends, and relationships that can help in understanding the problem.

4. After analysis, the next step is to develop a solution or plan. This involves identifying the most effective and efficient way to address the problem.

5. Finally, the solution is implemented and the results are evaluated. This involves monitoring the progress and making adjustments as needed to ensure the solution is effective.

[illegible][illegible][illegible]

1900

Ambassador in London and will be made available to the Cuban Government in due course. Her Majesty's Government are entirely satisfied after a careful study of all the evidence, that an incursion by armed forces of the Cuban Government into British territory took place on August 13.

The Cuban Government will recall the earlier statement given by Her Majesty's Ambassador last April that it was contrary to the policy of Her Majesty's Government to permit the use of force to acquire territory in the Caribbean for illicit purposes. They will also recall the official statement issued by the British Government at the time a report of British territory was taken to Cuba. These statements remain in force. It is already stated, I think, that on August 13 the British Government received information that an expedition had been sent to the British territory of Cayman Islands.

Her Majesty's Government have been most seriously concerned at this incursion into British territory and territorial waters, accompanied by the use of force, which was a violation of international law. Her Majesty's Government reserve all their rights arising out of this incident.

Her Majesty's Government further request from the Cuban Government an apology for this incursion and an assurance that clear orders will be given to the Cuban military authorities to prevent a repetition of such an incident.

Finally, Her Majesty's Government request the Cuban Government to return the prizes captured on August 13 to the British authorities in the Bahamas.

Her Majesty's Government avail themselves of this opportunity to refer to the Ministry of External Relations the expression of their deepest and most sincere wishes for cordial relations.

WILLIAM PIERCE

MAV 11

August 21, 1963

TRADUCCION NO-OFICIAL

La Embajada de Su Majestad Británica saluda muy atentamente al Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de la República de Cuba y siguiendo instrucciones del Secretario Principal de Estado para Relaciones Exteriores del Gobierno de Su Majestad, tiene el honor de llamar la atención del Ministerio al siguiente asunto.

Durante el mediodía del 13 de Agosto un avión de reconocimiento del Servicio de Guarda Costas de los Estados Unidos de América observó como unidades de la Marina de Guerra Revolucionaria sustraían a un grupo de personas de Cayo Anguila, isla que forma parte del banco de Cayo Sal en las Bahamas y, por lo tanto, bajo soberanía británica. Las unidades en cuestión se componían de un helicóptero y dos lanchas torpederas. El helicóptero ya había aterrizado cuando se descubrió su presencia en dicho lugar y se vieron ir a tierra a los tripulantes de las lanchas torpederas.

Inmediatamente se transmitió un reporte a Nassau, a consecuencia del cual se dieron ordenes al H.M.S. "Caprice", destroyer de la Real Armada que se encontraba en camino hacia el area de Cayo Anguila en una patrulla de rutina, para que investigara el caso. Dicho destroyer llegó al lugar de referencia el día 14 de Agosto, encontrando allí 10 ciudadanos cubanos, quienes manifestaron que sus compañeros, hasta un número de 19, habían sido capturados en la isla el día anterior por unidades de la Marina de Guerra Revolucionaria y traídos a Cuba. Apparently ellos habían logrado evadir su captura. Sus declaraciones corroboraron el reporte que se había recibido.

El Gobierno de Su Majestad ha tomado debida nota de las declaraciones del Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, publicadas el día 14 de Agosto, en las cuales se manifestaba

que.... /

que varias personas habían sido capturadas por unidades de la Armada de Guerra Revolucionaria "en las proximidades de Cayo Azul". Estas declaraciones omiten toda referencia al hecho de que un helicóptero cubano aterrizó en territorio británico y que unidades cubanas traspasaron las aguas jurisdiccionales británicas. Las pruebas en este sentido son, sin embargo, irrefutables e incluyen un grupo de fotografías tomadas por el avión de reconocimiento de los Estados Unidos "Perícaro", copias de las cuales están siendo mostradas al Embajador de Cuba en Londres y se pondrán a disposición del Gobierno Revolucionario en su oportunidad. El Gobierno de Su Majestad Británica, después de un minucioso estudio de toda la evidencia en su poder, está completamente convencido de que el día 13 de agosto se llevó a cabo una incursión de territorio británico por fuerzas armadas del Gobierno Revolucionario de Cuba.

El Gobierno Revolucionario recordará que durante el mes de abril el Embajador de Su Majestad Británica dió amplias seguridades de que su Gobierno se opondría terminantemente al uso de sus territorios en el Caribe con fines ilegales. También se recordará que en esa ocasión se tomaron medidas efectivas para evitar que se utilizara territorio británico con estos propósitos. Estas medidas continúan en vigor. Como se ha manifestado, el destructor de la Real Armada "Carrico" estaba patrullando precisamente esa zona cuando ocurrió el incidente de referencia y debía llegar a Cayo Azul el día 14 de agosto.

En vista de lo que antecede, el Gobierno de Su Majestad Británica protesta enérgicamente ante esta incursión de territorio y aguas jurisdiccionales británicas, acompañado del uso de fuerza, lo cual representa una violación de la ley internacional. El Gobierno de Su Majestad Británica se reserva todos

los.... /

...brechos que pudiesen resultar de este incidente.

Al mismo tiempo, el Gobierno de Su Majestad solicita del Gobierno Revolucionario de Cuba una disculpa por esta incursión así como que se le ofrezcan garantías plenas de que se darán instrucciones precisas a las autoridades militares con el fin de evitar que se repitan incidentes similares.

Finalmente, el Gobierno de Su Majestad Británica solicita del Gobierno Revolucionario de Cuba la devolución y entrega a las autoridades británicas en las Bahamas de los prisioneros capturados en Cayo Anguila.

La Embajada de Su Majestad Británica aprovecha la oportunidad para reiterar al Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores el testimonio de su más alta y distinguida consideración.

GOBIERNO DE SU MAJESTAD BRITANICA

W. B. A.

Agosto 21, 1963.

TELEGRAMCypher ~~code~~ ~~on chair~~

From:— FOREIGN OFFICE

To:— HAVANA

Despatched

Received

No. 590 of August 20, 1963.

psl 6/9

CONFIDENTIAL

Following received from Washington.

Addressed to Foreign Office tel no. 2579 of August 19 repeated for information Havana and Governor Bahamas.

CAY SAL.

State Department have advised us that at his weekly press conference tomorrow, President Kennedy will most certainly be asked about Anguilla Cay incident and discussions with Her Majesty's Government to which Mr. Rush referred on the 16th of August (our tel no. 2561). President would like to be able to refer to consultations which took place in Nassau on August 17 (Governor Bahamas tel no. 232 to the Colonial Office.

2. Co-ordinator for Cuban affairs has suggested, on the advice of White House, that it would be appropriate and useful if statement on Nassau consultations could first be made by Her Majesty's Government to which President could refer. He suggested that our statements might refer to consultations as a review at which existing arrangements for consultations had been brought up-to-date. He hoped it would indicate that as a result co-operation would be closer and control the effectiveness.

3. We have said that in view of the very short time available to consider arrangements discussed in Nassau it may not be possible for us to make a prior statement; also that if we do we would probably wish to make it clear that arrangements covering this use of British territory by Cuban enigres (under) as incursion from Cuba. But I agree that it would be appropriate if initial statement came from us, and I hope you will be able to make some announcement on the lines proposed. If a decision has been taken about action in Havana on Anguilla Cay incident you may wish added mention of our

CONFIDENTIAL

intention to protest to Cuban Government.

4. If you agree to make a statement I shall be grateful for text by 1500 hours B.S.T. August 20 so that it may be made available to President whose press conference commences at 4 p.m. local time.

For info Office press Havana 152.

SCSFA

CONFIDENTIAL

TELEGRAMCypher ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

From :— FOREIGN OFFICE

To :— HAVANA

Despatched

Received

No. 582

of August 17, 1963.

CONFIDENTIAL

Following received from Washington.

Address to Foreign Office tel No. 2569 of August 17 repeated for information Havana, Governor Bahamas and SNOWI.

My tel no. 2535 paragraph 3 CAY SAL.

We were shown the coastguards photographs incident at the State Department yesterday evening. CRIMINS the Co-ordinator for Cuban affairs said that as fact that photographs had been taken was known to the press and in view of tendentious accounts of the incident put out by the Cuban Government, who did not admit that their forces had landed on British territory, it had been decided to release them for publication. A selection of photographs was released later on also. In agreement with State Department we gave advance notice to British journalists in Washington.

2. Full sets of headed photographs are being despatched by bag today to you and to Havana.

Foreign Office Please pass Havana 148.

SOSFA

CONFIDENTIAL

TELEGRAMCypher ~~XXXXXXX~~IMMEDIATE

From:— FOREIGN OFFICE

To:— HAVANA

Despatched

Received

No. 580

of

August 17, 1963.

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

Your tel 595.

Following is repetition of Governor Bahamas tel 227 to the Colonial Office.

Addressed to Colonial Office tel no. 227 of August 16 repeated for information Washington, Havana, No. 72 and SNOWI. CAY SAL.

Your tel 307 repeating tel no 7955 from Foreign Office to Washington.

I am entirely satisfied from the evidence now available to me (including photographs, copies which I understand are being sent to you from Washington) that a Cuban incursion of Bahamian territory has taken place. I agree that protest should be made forthwith.

2. I agree your paragraph 2. For your own information SNOWI and Admiralty's STEVENS AND United States coastguard are meeting here tomorrow to concert future co-operation.

SOSFA

CONFIDENTIAL

P.H. Scott, Esq.,
Chargé d'Affaires,
British Embassy
HAVANA.



Mr. Hester 21/8
Pol
21/8

With the compliments of
THE BRITISH EMBASSY

Mr. I.J.M. Sutherland

August 17, 1963. WASHINGTON, D.C.

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON.

August 17, 1963.

As promised in paragraph 2 of our telegram No.2569 of today's date I am enclosing a set of the photographs of the incident at Anguilla Bay in the Bahamas which were taken by the United States Coast Guard aircraft on April 12th. There are sixty-five numbered photographs. If you or Paul Scott in Havana, to whom I am copying this letter with the photographs, wish to refer to any individual print please quote the serial number written on the back.

2. As already reported, a collection of the photographs was released to the press yesterday evening. In addition to the reasons given in paragraph 1 of our telegram under reference, Crimmins said that the Administration was under increasingly heavy pressure to publish full details from Congress and also from the press. I said that, in view of the statement which he had made previously to me (paragraph 3 of our telegram No.2551 of August 15) we should prefer that publication be delayed while the case was still under consideration. But as the Americans had clearly decided to go ahead and as they were American photographs, I did not insist. I enclose a copy of a statement by the Chairman of the House Republican Policy Committee's Task Force in Cuba which illustrates the kind of thing which is being said by the Administration's critics.

3. I am also copying this letter to the Governor of the Bahamas with a copy of the Republican Task Force statement only.

(I.J.M. Sutherland)

A.D. Parsons, Esq.,
American Department,
Foreign Office, C.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

FROM: Subcommittee on Special Project House Republican Policy Committee, 1040 New House Office Building.

Rep. James F. Battin (R-Mont), Chairman of the House Republican Policy Committee's Task Force on Cuba and Subversion in the Western Hemisphere, charged today that the Kennedy Administration "provided more air cover for the Castro kidnapping of Cuban exiles than it did for the freedom fighters at the Bay of Pigs".

Referring to the kidnapping of 19 Cuban refugees from an island in the British Bahamas on Tuesday, August 13th, Representative Battin said:

"Under this Administration the United States is rapidly becoming an 'export' witness rather than a participant in the cold war. First, we watched the Cuban freedom fighters as they were slaughtered at the Bay of Pigs. Then we witnessed the building of the Berlin Wall. Now, we are providing air cover for international brigandage."

The Montana Republican noted that a responsible official of the State Department provided the information that a Coast Guard Patrol plane and at least two jet fighter planes hovered over the island for two hours Tuesday afternoon while forces of the Soviet puppet Castro rounded up refugees, loaded them on ships and a helicopter, and took them back to Cuba, 40 miles away.

"It is incredible that American military aircraft would simply witness this invasion of the territory of an ally by Castro's forces without taking action of any kind", Battin said. "They didn't even notify the British that the whole thing was going on until after it was over."

"Moreover, apparently realizing that this business is going to sicken a whole lot of Americans, the Administration withheld this sordid story for almost 48 hours and then only acted after the story broke in England." Representative Battin also charged that the State Department is now withholding photographs taken of the incident and has classified them as "unreleasable". He said he was not surprised at this and added that "photos of this nature are certainly nothing of which the Administration could be proud".

In concluding his statement, Battin added:

"Averell Harriman said recently that we must deal with Castro with patience and forbearance. The Administration action of last Tuesday carries this principle too far. I would hope that Mr. Harriman would take time out from his pushing of the nuclear test ban treaty recently signed with Castro's Soviet masters to give the answers to the following questions:

"Why was the news of the Castro invasion of British territory withheld by the government for two days?

"Why in Heaven's name was no action taken to prevent the success of the invasion?

Is this a sample of the way that the Administration is isolating Castro?"



32/8
m KSP
Paf
21/8

With the compliments of
THE BRITISH EMBASSY
(I.J.M. Lutherland)

WASHINGTON, D.C.
August 16, 1963

CONFIDENTIAL

1081

(10621/63)

BRITISH EMBASSY.

WASHINGTON, D.C.

August 16, 1963.

— I enclose a copy of a minute dated August 15 recording the start of the Agnelli Jay incidents summarized in our telegram No. 2555 of August 15.

— 2. I also enclose cuttings on the incident from the New York Times and other papers for August 16.

— 3. I am copying this letter with a copy of the minute to Paul Scott in Havana, to the Governor of the Bahamas and enclosing an extra copy for the Admiralty.

(I. J. M. Sutherland)

J. M. Brown, Sec.,
American Department,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Grimmins, the Co-ordinator for Cuban Affairs has telephoned me to give the following account of the Anguilla island incident. It has emerged from the interrogation of the 10 Cubans who were landed at Key West earlier to-day.

2. On August 1 six emigré Cubans left Florida for Anguilla Key in two boats, one a 23 ft. outboard motor boat "Sylvia Eder" of U.S. (Florida) registration flying the United States flag, and the other a 21 ft. unregistered vessel. The second vessel subsequently broke down and was abandoned in the Cay Sal area. The six men landed on Anguilla Cay and remained there until August 7 when four of them set out for Caibarien on the North Coast of Las Villas in Cuba. According to their account they sailed right into the port of Caibarien and only took down the U.S. flag as they entered the harbour. On August 12 the four emigré Cubans returned to Anguilla Cay with 23 refugees, the majority relatives of the original six. On August 12 there were, therefore, a total of 29 Cubans on Anguilla Cay including the 23 refugees, the four men in the "Sylvia Eder" and the two who were left behind. On August 13 the Cuban gunboats and helicopter arrived at Anguilla and took off 19 of these people, 13 men, 3 women and 3 children. Those included one man from the original six who set out from Miami. This left 7 men, two women and one child who escaped capture and who have now arrived in Florida in the Coast Guard vessel "Ariadne".

3. According to the account given by the 10 who have arrived in Florida there were two separate incidents involving units of the Cuban forces, and firing took place on both occasions. On August 8, when the two Cubans of the six who arrived there from Florida were on Anguilla island another small boat with three Cuban refugees only arrived from Cuba. This party of three had no connection with the refugees who came from Caibarien and they subsequently left in their boat in the direction of Dog Rocks and have not been heard of since (they may, however, have been picked up by U.S.S. Caprice as the signal from U.S.S. I. states that 13 and not 10 refugees were collected by that vessel). On August 8 there were, therefore, five Cubans on the island. At about 4.30 p.m. on August 8 a helicopter and two single winged mono-planes flew low over the island. The helicopter was not identified but the two mono-planes had Cuban markings on the rudders. The aircraft fired at the group on the ground, sank a small boat

/but

CONFIDENTIAL

but there were no casualties (Mr. Crimmins did not know which boat was sunk).

4. On August 13 when the "Sylvia Eder" had returned from Cuba and there then 29 people on the island a helicopter (No. 25 with Cuban markings and armed with two machine guns) flew low over the island and fired on the group of refugees. At the same time two patrol boats of about 65 ft. length described as new and Soviet built, approached the island. Subsequently five armed men in orange flying suits were landed from the helicopter and five members of the Cuban militia in olive green, also armed, were landed from the patrol vessels. This group of men shot wildly and there were no casualties. 10 of the group of Cubans on the island, 13 men, 3 women and 3 children were taken off in the patrol boat, the group included one Red Priest Minister. At this point, however, the U.S. jet aircraft arrived on the scene and the Cubans prepared to leave. As a result they did not locate the 10 people who have now reached Florida. The group of Cuban refugees was unarmed except for two old Springfield's which were not fired.

5. The above information is derived from confidential briefing of the Cubans who are now in Miami, but they will be released later to-day and the press, who are hot after them will soon have their version of the story.

(I. J. M. Sutherland)
August 15, 1963

TELEGRAMCypherOTFX~~XXXXXX~~XXXXXX/CLAM

From:— FOREIGN OFFICE

To:—

HAVANA

Despatched

Received

No. 570 of August 15, 1963.

CONFIDENTIAL

Following received from Washington.
Addressed to Foreign Office tel no. 2547 of August 15
and repeated for information to Governor Bahamas,
Havana and SNOWI.

Governor Bahamas tel no. 223 to Colonial Office
paragraph 3.

As reported in my telegram 2535 Americans have
undertaken to provide photographs. As seen from
here an early protest to Cuban Government is clearly
called for, but it would seem desirable to have in
addition to photographs, full account of details of
what actually happened. There are discrepancies
between figures for number of refugees involved given
in various reports received. State Department have
transmitted figure quoted in my telegram No. 2540
to eight men one woman and one child who they state
were collected from ANGUILLA CAY by United States
coastguard (2 undec) C.B.F.C.A. signal CASEC 21
of August 15 to Ministry of Defence stating that
Caprice recovered 13 refugees. We should be grateful
for fuller report from Caprice in particular for
evidence that some or all of Cubans involved were
in fact refugees who had arrived on the island from
Cuba. State Department believe that this is so, but
admit that according to their latest information that
2 boats taken during raid were United States registered.

2. State Department have promised to provide informati-
-on obtained from interrogation of Cubans in Key West.

Foreign Office please pass Havana 142.

SOSFA

1081 PM 16/8
TELEGRAM

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

en clair

PRIORITY

From :— HAVANA

To :— FOREIGN OFFICE

Despatched 6.10 p.m.

Received

No. 589 of August 14, 1963.

repeated for information to Governor Bahamas (47)

Following is the text of an official announcement by the Cuban Ministry of Armed Forces issued today and carried in the evening papers: "Units of the Revolutionary Navy caught up with and recovered in the vicinity of Cay Anguila two Cuban fishing boats which had been taken by counter-revolutionary elements.

2. The assailants of the boats were captured, amongst them four members of counter-revolutionary organisations based in Miami, who had been clandestinely introduced to Cuba by the CIA to carry out activities of a subversive nature against our country.

3. Cay Anguila, in British possessions, situated in the bank of Cay Sal is being used by the CIA and counter revolutionary elements at its service to introduce spies, saboteurs and weapons into the national territory.

4. The Cuban Government will protest to the British Government about these deeds, and about the use of their territory for activities against Cuba."

Foreign Office please pass Governor Bahamas (47)

SCOTT

TELEGRAMCypher OTP ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

From :— FOREIGN OFFICE

To :— HAVANA

Despatched

Received

No. 565 of August 15, 1963.

CONFIDENTIAL

Following received from Washington.

Addressed to Foreign Office tel no. 2535 August 14 and repeated for information to Governor Balamas, Havana and SNOWI.

My telegram 2529: CAY SAL.

In telephone discussion with Governor, question has arisen of availability of 155 coastguard photographs as supporting evidence for possible protest in Havana. As Governor has already been informed by telephone that State Department have no objection to releasing them to us for this purpose and would, if necessary in the last resort, have no objection to inflicting publication although they would prefer to avoid this if possible. Coastguards are flying copies direct to Nassau. We shall ~~we~~ also try to get copies here for onward transmission to you in case you wish to see them in connexion with consideration of possibility of a protest.

2. Following Havana radio announcement about capture "off CAY SAL of two boats with counter-revolutionary agents," State Department have, in answer to enquiries given details of abduction of "Cuban refugees" as observed by United States aircraft, adding that information had been passed to British authorities.

Foreign Office pass Havana 140

SOSFA

TELEGRAMCypher ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

From :— FOREIGN OFFICE

To :— HAVANA

Despatched

Received

No. 558

of

August 14, 1963.

CONFIDENTIAL

Following from Washington.
Addressed to Foreign Office tel no. 3526 of August 13 repeated for information to Governor Bahamas, Havana, SNOWI.

My tel 3523: CAY SAL (not to SNOWI)

State Department have received further report from the United States coastguard that at 1615 hours local time on August 13 reconnaissance aircraft observed two Cuban gun boats and one helicopter at ANGUILLA CAY. A group of people, presumably refugees, was taken off the island and put aboard the gun boats. Two small vessels were taken in tow. At 1815 hours the two gun boats were observed about 20 miles west of ANGUILLA proceeding towards either CAY SAL or Cuba. No refugees were observed on CAY SAL.

2. State Department understand that the above is a fuller account of the incident of our tel under reference and does not refer to a separate incident but are checking with the coastguard H.Q. 6206 believe that the persons abducted from ANGUILLA were refugees recently arrived from Cuba and state that they have no reason to think that they were emigrés.

3. As coastguard reports are en clair and can be monitored it is likely that some account of the incident will be in tomorrow's press.

Foreign Office pass Havana 138.

SOSFA.

CONFIDENTIAL

(1081/63)

TELEGRAM

Cypher ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ on clear

120
19/8

From :— FOREIGN OFFICE

To :— HAVANA

Despatched

Received

No. 557 of August 14, 1963.

CONFIDENTIAL

Following received from Washington.

Addressed to Foreign Office tel no. 3523 of August 13 repeated for information to Governor Bahamas and Havana.

Cay Sal.

State Department have informed us that United States reconnaissance aircraft this morning spotted Cuban naval gun-boats in Cay Sal apparently engaged in picking up refugees who had landed on one of islands in group.

2. According to State Department this has been cabled direct to service centre Nassau.

Foreign Office please pass Havana (137)

SOSFA

CONFIDENTIAL

TELEGRAMCypher ~~XXXXXXX~~

From:— NASSAU

To:— HAVANA

Despatched

Received

No. 58 of undated

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed Secretary of State for the Colonies (223) (Foreign Office please) repeated for information British Ambassador Washington (79), Havana (58) and to S.N.O.W.I. (68).

CAY SAL.

Following report received orally on evening of August 13 from United States coastguard Miami through United States Consul General Nassau.

At 4 p.m. on August 13 United States coastguard aircraft had under surveillance 18 Cuban refugees on Anguilla Cay in CAY SAL bank when 2 Cuban gun boats and one helicopter appeared and removed the refugees. The coastguard aircraft after turning back the coastguard cutter which was to pick up the refugees watched and photographed CUBANS operation.

2. Report was passed immediately by Joint Services staff Nassau to H.M. ships CAPRICE and LONDONERRY, both then in the vicinity and former being due to patrol CAY bank today August 14.

3. Question arises as to whether evidence of U.S. (2 groups omitted) photographs, are to be used to support formal protest to the Cuban Government.

4. Incident intensifies need to deny the misuse of CAY SAL to both counter revolutionaries (5 groups omitted).

5. I am consulting S.N.O.W.I. concerning paragraph 4 grateful if Washington can answer paragraph 3 and if London will instruct Havana accordingly.

(10 1/63)

Page 93

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy present their compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba and with reference to the Ministry's memorandum of the 22nd of February about allegedly illegal activities against the Republic of Cuba from certain Keys which form part of the territory of the Bahamas, have the honour to inform the Ministry that the Government of the Bahamas have conducted extensive and thorough investigations of this problem. These investigations have revealed that certain of the islands which are largely uninhabited had been used to a limited extent for illegal purposes.

The British officer Mr. Thompson has denied all allegations made against him.

Her Majesty's Government will continue to do their best to prevent use of British territory to persons engaged in activities against the Cuban Government and recent events in the area have demonstrated that these Government assurances are already being supported by action.

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy avail themselves of this opportunity to renew to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the assurances of their highest and most distinguished consideration.

Yours faithfully,

A. A.

April 11, 1963.

La Embajada de Su Majestad Británica saluda muy atentamente al Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de la República de Cuba y con referencia al Memorandum de Febrero 22 al Ministerio sobre supuestas actividades ilegales en contra de la República de Cuba desde ciertos cayos que forman parte del territorio de las Bahamas, tiene el honor de informar al Ministerio que el Gobierno de las Bahamas ha llevado a cabo exhaustivas y concienzudas investigaciones de este problema. Estas investigaciones han puesto en descubierto el hecho de que algunos de estos cayos, en su mayoría deshabitados, se han estado utilizando con fines ilegales.

El súbdito británico Sr. Thompson ha negado los cargos que se le imputan.

El Gobierno de Su Majestad continuará haciendo su mejor esfuerzo para evitar que territorio británico sea utilizado por personas que llevan a cabo actividades en contra del Gobierno de Cuba y recientes acontecimientos en esa zona han demostrado que estas seguridades están respaldadas por hechos.

La Embajada de Su Majestad Británica aprovecha esta oportunidad para reiterar al Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores el testimonio de su más alta y distinguida consideración.

EMBAJADA BRITÁNICA,

HABANA.

Abril 11, 1963.



CONFIDENTIAL

WIS. 339/340/03

PRIORITY

SAVING

From the Secretary of State for the Colonies. *HC*
To the Officer Administering the Government of *10/11/63*
BAHAMAS NO. 140. *Filed 11/4*

Repeated to the British Ambassadors:

WASHINGTON }
HAVANA } via Foreign Office.

" to the United Kingdom High Commissioners:

JAMAICA }
TRINIDAD } via Commonwealth
Relations Office.

" " S.N.O.W.I. (via Admiralty)

DATE 21st March, 1963.

Colonial Office Telegram No. 106 of 18th March, 1963.

Elbow Cay, etc.

You will wish to see the enclosed copy of a letter of the 17th March signed by Mr. Ashmann and Mr. Barnhard, the original of which Mr. Ashmann gave to Mr. Parsons during the interview on the 18th March. Also enclosed is a copy of Mr. Parsons' official note of that interview. The letter is actually addressed to Mr. Duncan Sandys because, when it was being prepared, Mr. Ashmann thought that Mr. Sandys would be the person he and his associate would see in London. As it transpired, they were directed to the Foreign Office but did not have time to change the address of the letter. The letter should now be regarded as being addressed to the Foreign Office.

2. The Foreign Office regard the letter as being partly replied to by what was said at the 18th March interview. In order that further consideration may be given to it, however, it would be appreciated if you would forward, as quickly as possible (telegraphing if appropriate) any comments you may have on it, and on Mr. Parsons' note, both generally and as regards any details (particularly those relating to statements and actions by the Bahamas Government) which may not, in the meantime, have been dealt with in current telegraphic correspondence. Inter alia, can you give the terms of the "accompanying statements" which Bahamas officials are said (in the seventh paragraph of the Ashmann/Barnhard letter) to have made at the same time as announcing the "findings" (i.e. presumably the press release quoted in your telegram No.62 of the 6th March)?

/3.

CONFIDENTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L

3. The material which Mr. Ashmann and his associate produced at the 18th March interview with Mr. Parsons included photographs, Bahamas press cuttings relating to the statements said to have accompanied the announcement of the "findings" and spent ammunition said to have been collected from Elbow Cay, but the callers did not leave the material with the Foreign Office. None of it appeared to add anything substantial to what was already known in the Foreign Office.

4. A copy of the Parliamentary Question and Answer, referred to in paragraph 4 of Mr. Parsons' note, was sent to you under cover of a C.O.2 form on the 19th March. The letter to Sir David Ormsby-Gore, which Mr. Ashmann and Mr. Barnhard refer to in the first paragraph of their 17th March letter, is understood to be that which was copied with Mr. Sutherland's letter to Mr. Parsons (No. 10621/63) of the 4th March (copied to you direct from the British Embassy, Washington).

SECR.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Flag A

1. I repeat the Mr. Wilson's submission of March 8.

Flag B

2. Mr. Ashman called on the Governor of the Bahamas on March 15 (rec the Governor's telegram No. 75). He subsequently came to London and got in touch with Mr. Harold Wilson over the telephone. Mr. Wilson telephoned me this morning to advise that Mr. Ashman was badgering him and that he, Mr. Wilson, intended to put him in touch with the Foreign Office. The Labour Party had made clear to Mr. Ashman that they were not prepared to allow him to make this problem an issue of British domestic politics and were insisting that he deal with it through the proper channels. I explained to Mr. Ashman that I would be in touch with me.

3. Mr. Ashman's associate, Mr. Barnhard, called on me this afternoon. They went over their story in remorseless detail and produced a large photographic evidence which in fact was nothing more than what we already know. They admitted that their objective was to relieve the maximum publicity for their story in order to influence the Castro Government and affect the release of the captured man. They claimed that their story had been entirely supported by a statement put out by the Bahama Government on March 6 to the effect that the whole affair was closed. They wanted an assurance from me that this was not the case and that the new evidence which they had produced would be examined.

4. I pointed out to them that the investigations carried out by the Governor had produced no evidence in support of the allegation that a Cuban commando had abducted anyone from Abaco Cay; that the press reports to which they referred were tendentious and went beyond the wording of the Governor's official communique; and that our position had been made clear in Parliament on March 13 by the Colonial Secretary. In reply to a further barrage of questions and pleas for

Flag C

/re-assurance

re-assurance, I said that the U.S. and the French Government
were concerned in London with the alleged illegal occupation
and use of British territory. A full report has not yet been
received from the Governor; and evidence of any illegal
occupation and use of our territory would of course be considered.

5. Mr. Jordan and his wife are returning to the United
States within the next few days. Their press campaign (which has so
far aroused little interest here or in the United States), may
gain momentum from their visit to London: "Daily Express" re-
sponding on the point of publication, an illustrated article on
the subject. I suspect from Mr. Jordan's manner that he has been
disturbed more I told him earlier to publicly state that the British
Government is to support him either or both. I have got the
impression that my name will probably start to figure in his
campaign.

6. I am copying this letter to the Lord Privy Seal's office,
to Foreign Department, to the Colonial Office and to Mr. Greenhill
in Washington.

(J. I. Roberts)

London 10, 1953.

Enclosure

L/53/2

SAVOY HOTEL LONDON

TELEPHONE: TEMPLE BAR 1011

TELEGRAMS: SAVOTEL LONDON

17th March 1963

Right Hon. Duncan Sanjays, M.P.,
Secretary of State for Commonwealth
Relations and for the Colonies,
Westminster,
LONDON, S.W.1.

Sir,

E/37/2

On March 2nd, 1963, I addressed a communication to His
Excellency, Sir David Graham Gore, at the British Embassy in
Washington, D.C. In that letter I appealed to your Government
to intervene in a situation which has placed eight men's lives
in jeopardy.

On or about February 21st, 1963, Domingo Martinez and seven
other Cuban fishermen, in a party that originated in Miami, Florida,
were in the Crawl Bay area and in fact landed on the Bay because of
bad weather and limited fuel.

Late that evening, as observed by other fishermen in the area, 1
two patrol boats bearing the insignia of the Castro Government and
carrying armed militia, landed at Crawl Bay and violently arrested
Martinez and the other men. Subsequently, reports indicated that
the militia action was apparently an effort of the Cuban Government
to capture anti-Castro raiders that had recently attacked the Cuban
coast.

See 16

Subsequent to our appeal on March 1st, an investigation was
launched by British Marines and Tanzanian Police to determine whether
or not there was substance to the allegations of abduction and
apparently to clarify the entire situation with regard to Crawl
Bay's involvement with military groups of any kind.

./.

SAVOY HOTEL LONDON

TELEPHONE: TEMPLE BAR 4113

TELEGRAMS: SAVOTEL LONDON

As this inspection was being conducted we brought to your attention that the Hon. Frank Sutherland, British Consul in Havana, Florida, in information of other fishermen who witnessed the sinking of the ship. It was most difficult to gain a location where the witnesses could be heard but Mr. Sutherland finally agreed to listen to their story.

We must also mention to the fact that despite the seriousness of the situation, transcripts of that testimony were not made available to the United States in keeping those men alive. We recognize that the Consul's Office is not a formal administrative forum or a court of law but the purpose of that presentation and the imminence of possible execution of innocent men certainly warranted unusual effort to seek the truth and act accordingly.

I respectfully submit to you that the reported findings of the President's inquiry as announced through the Office of the United States Colonial Affairs Secretary and the Governor of the Bahamas, were certainly misleading and together with the accompanying statements by those Bahamian officials represented a distortion of the facts and critical disregard of the full truth.

See 34

See 4
On a personal visit to Abaco Bay this past Sunday, on which I was accompanied by several officials, a photographer (to verify our findings) and others, we found substantial evidence to corroborate our belief that there had been considerable recent military activity and previous military activity during past months on Abaco Bay. In addition some evidence was found to corroborate our belief that Domingo Larinier and the other fishermen, subsequently described by the Castro government as pirates or as agent of the United States C.I.A., were in fact on Abaco Bay on or about the day in question.

There is, of course, the significant first-hand account of the incident as related by the captain and crew of the fishing vessel "The V. The report of the reports have not been related and there has been no indication of any reason to doubt the veracity of the statements. The men were accompanied by their employer who vouched for them at the British Consulate in Havana. These facts have been further substantiated by further material previously given to Mr. Sutherland at the British Embassy in Washington.

SAVOY HOTEL LONDON

TELEPHONE TEMPLE BAR 3113

TELEGRAMS SAVOTEL LONDON

It is not our desire to in any way become involved in the intricacies of international relations with regard to the Castro problem.

It is, however, as indicated upon our awareness that history vividly demonstrates the British Empire's continuous respect for democratic and international law and your Government's refusal to tolerate unauthorized intrusions on her sovereignty that impinge any person who may be even temporarily clothed with the traditional protection that sovereignty affords.

We cannot disregard the misleading and erroneous report indicating no evidence of military activity and no evidence to support the allegations concerning these eight men on Wilson Bay.

It is our belief that the eight men are still alive. It is our firm belief that the eight men are still alive. Pending further British authorities, the British Government will not execute these men. The Government has also often indicated its sensitivity to a variety of situations, particularly to executions. International concern to Castro's probable intrusion in the Bahamas and of the innocence of these eight men, are deep and alive.

It is, of course, our hope that a full investigation of the matter will result in affirmative action by the British Government seeking to return all these men to the Bahamian authorities in a manner as they were illegally abducted from Bahamian territory originally.

It is, however, our request, on behalf of the families, and/or the friends of these eight innocent men, that your Government continue its inquiry into the matter and notify the Castro Government of the continued interest in the men's status pending resolution of the questions raised by the evidence discovered on the island and the eyewitness accounts thereto. We therefore submit to you for your perusal various material obtained by us during the visit to Wilson Bay.

In addition there is a set of photographs which may not be published because of obvious restrictions placed on them by Life Magazine, which document the discoveries made on the island.

SAVOY HOTEL LONDON

TELEPHONE 3411 BAR 611

TELEGRAMS SAVOTEL LONDON

In reference to your letter of the 10th inst. regarding the further correspondence of the Hon. Mr. Cyril Stevenson, a member of the House of Commons and publisher of the "Daily Worker".

It appears that the Hon. Mr. Stevenson was proceeding in his efforts to secure the lives of the "Daily Worker" and its staff. He further exhibits a noticeable hesitancy to air all the facts concerning the incidents.

It is requested that you advise the Hon. Mr. Stevenson of the fact that the Hon. Mr. Stevenson is responsible for the lives of the "Daily Worker" and its staff. It is requested that you advise the Hon. Mr. Stevenson of the fact that the Hon. Mr. Stevenson is responsible for the lives of the "Daily Worker" and its staff.

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Very truly yours,

CHARLES H. HARRISON

1031/63

TELEGRAM

Cypher ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

Pol
4/4

From: — F.O.

To: — HAVANA

Despatched

Received

No. 227 of March 20, 1963.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

G U A R D

Following received from Bahamas.

Addressed to U.S. telegram No. 77 of March 19. REI
Washington, Havana, telegram No. 19 HIS Jamaica and
Trinidad, ONCI.

Elbow Cay.

Your telegrams No 106 and 107. Attorney General has
completed the details of the review of all available
evidence put forward by ASIAN. His conclusion is that,
although the possibility of CASTRO raids on Elbow Cay
cannot conclusively be ruled out, there is not sufficient
evidence on which to base any diplomatic action.

2. That this and other BAYS on JAY LAL bank have been
sporadically used by counter-revolutionaries operating
out of FLORIDA has never been in doubt but at no time up
to and including recent investigation by US Ships ULSTER
and JAGUAR aided by US Army police party has evidence
been found of permanent base, arms dump or radio install-
ation.

3. Yesterday March 16 the head of special branch
received in MIAMI following information from a reliable
source. The 2 SIGA-type 2.100 fishing vessels were
captured in Cuba in December by a party from FLORIDA
aided by 2 Americans named HENRY LEAVES and H. HINGS. The
boats were taken to and left at Elbow Cay whilst the 2
Americans returned to FLORIDA leaving 3 Cuban companions
on the Cay. When the two Americans returned the Cay
with fuel for the 2 captured boats they found that the two
boats and the 3 Cubans had disappeared. The 2

CONFIDENTIAL

/Americans

TELEGRAM

Cypher code en clair

From :— HAVANA

To :— FOREIGN OFFICE

Despatched

Received

No. 228

of

4/3

CONFIDENTIAL

Addresse' to Foreign Office tel no. 228 of 4/3 repeated for information to Washington (120) and Governor Bahamas (14).

Your telegram no. 180.

My summons to Ministry of Foreign Affairs this morning turned out to be on another subject. I took opportunity however to speak to Vice-Minister as instructed in paragraph 1 of your telegram no. 173. He thanked me warmly for action taken by Governor Bahamas and showed in discussion which followed that he appreciated the difficulties involved in keeping watch over islands in question.

2. Though Ashman's name was not mentioned, I referred casually to stories circulating in U.S. that three Cubans and one U.S. citizen had been captured and shot. He laughed this off as ridiculous but there was no further comment.

3. In paragraph 2 of your telegram 173 our attention is drawn to story in "to-day's London Times". For future reference please note that newspapers normally reach us with seven to ten days' delay.

MARCHANT

TELEGRAM

Cypher code en clair

9/13

From:— HAVANA

To:— FOREIGN OFFICE

Despatched

Received

No. 200

of

23/2

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office tel no. 200 of 23/2 repeated for information to Washington (97), Governor Bahamas (11) and Saving to JMKC Kingston (8) and UKHC Port of Spain (3), Mexico City (7) and Caracas (9).

My tel no. 197.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs summoned me last night and raised this matter. He again said that he was speaking on the personal instructions of Castro. His version of the story was substantially the same as in my tel no. 196 but he added that Cay Sal and the Anguilla Islands were to be used as well as Elbow Cay, as a base for operations not only against Cuban territory but against Cuban and British shipping. He requested that the British authorities should take steps to prevent the use of British territory for these purposes. He promised to send me an aide-memoire which has not yet arrived.

2. I spoke on the lines of my tel under reference and asked Dr. Roa about the sources of his information. When he admitted that it was based on prisoners' confessions, I suggested that it might be a cover story to conceal the true location of their base. I undertook to refer the whole matter to you. Dr. Roa's tone throughout was courteous and friendly.

3. I should be grateful for information and instructions. Might we say that steps will be taken to exercise more effective control over the use of these islands? Quite apart from any other consideration, Cuban counter measures against adventures of this kind seem to be so effective that further attempts are likely only to be ineffective and embarrassing.

MARCHANT

TELEGRAM

Cypher code en clair

From :— HAVANA

To :— FO

FO
9/13

Despatched

Received

No. 197

of

22/2

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to FO tel no. 197 of 22/2 repeated for information to Washington, Governor Bahams and Savino to UKHCs Kingston and Port of Spain, Mexico City and Caracas.

M.I.P.T.

If I receive such a protest, I propose to reply that I have no information beyond that in the press but that Elbow Cay is a small scrap of uninhabited territory and that British authorities are in no way involved in any illegal use that may have been made of it.

MARCHANT

TELEGRAM

~~Cipher~~ ~~XXXXXX~~ en clair

From:— HAVANA
~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

To:— FOREIGN OFFICE

Pol 9/3

Despatched

Received

No. 196

of

22/2

Addressed to Foreign Office tel no. 196 of 22/2
r.f.i. to Washington (94), Governor Bahamas (9) and
Savina to URMIC Kingston (6) Savina URMIC Port of Spain (6),
Mexico City (5), Caracas (7).

The Cuban press gives great prominence this morning
to the recovery by the Cuban Navy of last night of two
fishing boats seized at Carlenas on February 13. Eight
men were captured with the boats and are said to have
confessed that they were members of a group organized by
CIA to infiltrate into Cuba, introduce arms and commit
acts of sabotage and terror. Elbow Cay in the Cay Sal
group is said to have been used as a base and arms dump.
According to the press, the Cuban Government proposes to
protest to the British authorities against this use of
British territory for attacks on Cuba.

2. The attack on an American shrimp boat on February 20
is part of the same episode. The Ministry of the Armed
Forces published a communiqué yesterday in which they
admit that two Cuban planes flew low over the boat during
the search for the stolen Cuban boats. They deny that
they opened fire. According to the communiqué, Cuba does
not carry out acts of piracy of the type constantly
perpetrated by the Americans.

MARCHANT

1081/63

REPÚBLICA DE CUBA

MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

MEMORANDUM

La posición geográfica de los cayos de propiedad inglesa utilizados en actividades ilegales contra Cuba es la siguiente:

1. CAYO SAL : 23 grados 42 minutos latitud norte
80 grados 25 minutos longitud oeste
2. CAYO ELBOW : 23 grados 57 minutos latitud norte
80 grados 28 minutos longitud oeste
3. CAYO ANGUILA : 23 grados 32 minutos latitud norte
79 grados 35 minutos longitud oeste

Cayo Elbow pertenece a un banco de cayos denominado Banco Cayo - Sal, de cuyo banco forma parte también el llamado Cayo Sal.

Cayo Sal es usado principalmente por elementos contrarrevolucionarios y agentes de la CIA que abandonan el territorio nacional por la -- costa norte, en coordinación con embarcaciones propiedad de la CIA que se dedican a sacar del país a dichos elementos, reclamados en su mayoría por los Tribunales de Justicia. Cuentan para ello con la anuencia y la colaboración del ciudadano británico, Señor Thomson. Este mismo individuo -- se dedica a la venta de las embarcaciones que se quedan en dicho lugar, o son sustraídas a las cooperativas pesqueras cubanas.

Para ilustrar lo dicho con un hecho; el 5 de febrero de 1962, arribaron a Cayo Sal elementos contrarrevolucionarios que se fugaron del país por la playa de La Panchita. A los integrantes de este grupo, el referido ciudadano inglés les hizo proposiciones de que permanecieran en dicho cayo para colaborar a la fuga de contrarrevolucionarios de territorio cubano, a cambio de dinero. Días después de este incidente, embarcaciones contrarrevolucionarias que se encontraban ancladas en Cayo Sal realizaron un ataque contra las costas cubanas.

/Thomson

MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

- 2 -

Thomson recibe un tanto por ciento del producto de las ventas de tales embarcaciones.

Cayo Anguila es uno de los puntos más utilizados por las embarcaciones que se dedican a atacar arteralmente a las costas cubanas. Es el centro de operaciones del prófugo de la justicia cubana, ex-oficial de la dictadura de Batista, reclamado por los Tribunales cubanos por innumerables crímenes de guerra, ex-Coronel Sánchez Mosquera. En el mes de junio del pasado año, un contingente de los elementos, que dirige, entrenados por la CIA para efectuar actos criminales en territorio cubano, trató de introducirse en nuestro territorio procedente de Cayo Anguila. Integraban este grupo, entre otros, Juan Larralde, Lucas Sosa Castillo e Ignacio Gracia Rodríguez. Dichos elementos fueron transportados a Cayo Anguila por una embarcación norteamericana - desde las costas de Florida.

En ese mismo mes, otro grupo de elementos contrarrevolucionarios introducidos en Cuba, partieron de Cayo Anguila.

En el mes de febrero del año en curso, agentes de la CIA se introdujeron en territorio cubano teniendo como base de actividades - dicho cayo. Estos elementos mantienen en Cayo Anguila embarcaciones y una planta de radio con la que se comunican con los elementos infiltrados.

Cayo Anguila fue, asimismo, utilizado el día 15 del propio mes para introducir cargamentos de armas y explosivos con destino a los grupos de bandidos, que operan en la zona norte.

El objetivo central de los elementos contrarrevolucionarios - que utilizan las mencionadas posesiones inglesas, situadas al norte - de la isla de Cuba, es atentar contra las instalaciones industriales de nuestro país y afectar nuestra producción azucarera. Otro de sus -

/objetivos

MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

- 3 -

objetivos es sembrar el terror entre la población campesina indefensa y cometer hechos criminales del tipo del asesinato de dos inocentes criaturas, como el ocurrido en la zona de Bolondrón al norte de la provincia de Matanzas, que se encuentra situada cerca de la ubicación de dichos cayos, el asesinato de dos campesinos al norte de la provincia de Las Villas que fueron quemados vivos (padre e hijo), el asesinato de dos jóvenes granjeros y de un profesor de una Escuela de Instrucción Revolucionaria al norte de dicha provincia. Todos estos hechos son cometidos por agentes adiestrados por la CIA que usan como bases para sus operaciones y para infiltrarse en territorio cubano, Cayo Sal, Cayo Elbow y Cayo Anguila.

Uno de los piratas capturados hace dos días, junto con las dos embarcaciones pesqueras secuestradas por la CIA, declaró que aquella había impartido instrucciones de atacar con lanchas artilladas, guarecidas en cayos de la Florida y en Santurce, en la isla de Puerto Rico, buques de bandera extranjera que transporten mercancías a Cuba, en especial las de bandera inglesa, con la finalidad de agudizar el bloqueo comercial declarado a Cuba por el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos de América.

La Habana, 22 de febrero de 1963
"ANO DE LA ORGANIZACION"

Number.